The Omnipotence Paradox (or: Why Hackers are like God)

So much RSI has been induced by this conundrum over the years that it's almost a shame to bring it up again. But it's an important stumbling block so it needs to be spelled out. Essentially, the argument is a very simple reductio ad absurdum against the concept of an omnipotent entity, usually directed at the Judeo-Christian God. The way it works is simple:

God is omnipotent (meaning that he can do anything.)
God therefore must be able to conjure an act which He is incapable.
quod erat demonstrandum:
God is not omnipotent.

There is a derivate of the argument, specific to particular interpretations of the omnipotent being, particularly those which insist on this being being omnibenevolent and omniscient in addition to being omnipotent. This argument generally goes like this:

God is omnibenevolent (and therefore wills the abolition of pain and suffering)
God is omnipotent and omniscient (and therefore can prevent all pain and suffering)
There is pain and suffering.
quod erat demonstrandum:
God is either not: omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipotent or some combination thereof.

Together, these two arguments make up the core of any argument against mainstream theism. Now, the first argument can be settled with a very obvious observation, that the ability to handicap oneself does not make one handicapped. And so, the notion that an omnipotent deity could handicap itself, does not make it any less omnipotent at this current moment. However, this observation fails to answer the second argument with any satisfaction and completely misses the core of the misunderstanding.

The core of this misunderstanding is pretty simple. Our words do not mean what we think they mean. Our problem , of course, is with the word 'omnipotent.' The colloquial understanding of the word is this:

Omnipotence:
- The ability to actualize any cognition.

That is, can do anything we can think of, regardless of any inherent contradiction, which in fact incorrect. The real meaning is more subtle. This is to be expected, seeing as the word is an import from Latin, A language which is usually more precise in modern times than English. Naturally, omnipotent comes from the Latin roots: 'Omni' and 'Potens,' meaning 'all' and 'power' respectively. When combined, they mean something akin to "power over all things." Thus omnipotence is a reference not to what the entity can do, per se, but what the entity has power over. Hence, a better understanding would go thus:

Omnipotence:
-Absolute control over all of reality, in whole and in part.

This definition, while superficially sounding very much the same as the previous definition, actually suggests a much different relationship between omnipotent entity and the rest of reality. In the former definition, the deity acted more like an abstract will, arbitrating existence from a purely idealistic standpoint. The second definition, however, establishes omnipotence as, not some kind of innate property of the omnipotent, but as a relationship of the omnipotent to reality.

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Up to this point, this argument has been exposited before, many times. (Hence the RSI.) One can check Wikipedia for a good discussion of the issue in great philosophical depth. Normally at this point in the explanation, one uses some kind of analogy, and I'm no exception. However, my analogy will be a little different. Instead of Lewis's wonderfully eccentric painter, I've got a megalomaniac hacker (in the positive sense of the word).

You'll see how this works: A computer is a tool for automation and abstraction. It contains a world unto its own in which arbitrary sequences of boolean values are assigned meanings. All kinds of meanings mind you: meanings such as '4,' 'addition,' and 'kill neighbor,' are all valid. By merely mapping values to an underlying set of instructions and formats designed to hold any kind of information imaginable, one can literally simulate any kind of world. Freed from the constraints of physical matter, computers can simulate all kinds of worlds possessed of any kind of laws and with any variables set. With respect to these worlds, the creator, (in this instance a hacker,) is omnipotent.

Let's look at this omnipotence. A hacker can create a world which mirror our own:

(setf 'one 1)
(setf 'two 2)
(setf 'three 3)
(setf 'four 4)
(setf 'five 5)
etc...

So that the world's behavior mirrors our own:

(+ 'two 'two) => 4

Or he can create a world which is different:

(setf 'one 5)
(setf 'two 4)
(setf 'three 3)
(setf 'four 2)
(setf 'five 1)
etc...

And so create bizarre aberrations:

(+ 'two 'two) => 8
(+ 'five 'four) => 3
etc...

Or they can even change the rules at their most fundamental level:

(defun + (&rest rest)
(reduce #'- rest))

To remake reality in any arbitrary fashion desired:

(+ 2 2) => 0

Indeed, with the proper tools and knowhow, the hacker can even change the value of any variable, and redefine and function, at runtime. With respect to the little simulated computer people and their simulated computer world, he is god, and this is what we mean by omnipotent.

There are some things, however, that our hacker cannot do. He cannot, for example, make the simulation run faster than a certain point due to physical limitations of the computer. This doesn't affect his omnipotence however; he still has absolute control over the nature of his simulated world, this a limitation of the world in which he it a part. His control still holds, but it seems that there is a sort of meta law to which his law must conform. The hacker may create a world that is subject to any rules he chooses, but he may not in doing so violate any laws to which he himself is subject.

We can thus apply this perception of omnipotence to a supposedly omnipotent entity: The great hacker who created the great simulation in which we are but objects. He controls the fabric of our universe, but cannot violate the fabric of his own. We thus see how omnipotence is not impossible, just over ambitiously defined.

But, we haven't really gained anything from this. We've removed one of the difficulties in approaching the concept of an omnipotent being, but at the same time, we've removed the chief advantage: that an omnipotent being provides a Occamian explanation for reality (this, in fact is very similar to the first application of his so called razor.) That is, it is easiest to explain all of reality as coming from a single principle, and this principle is most easily described as some sort of demiurge, which would necessarily be omnipotent in the manner described by this definition.

Fortunately, this problem is simple to escape. Even if we assumed the hacker had a magical computer which was freed of all physical limitations and he himself was freed all physical limits as well, there would still be limits on his actions. Those come not from any limits placed on the machine or scientist externally but those stemming from the scientist himself. Even if we were to pull out all of the stops, he would still be limited by his own imagination. In this hypothetical, the hacker could define function '+' such that it meant division, multiplication, addition, and subtraction all at the same time and in exactly the same context without distinction, except that that concept would be meaningless to him. He himself is unsure of what that would mean.

Does he mean?:

(defun + '((lambda (&rest rest) (reduce #'/ rest))
(lambda (&rest rest) (reduce #'* rest))
(lambda (&rest rest) (reduce #'+ rest))
(lambda (&rest rest) (reduce #'- rest))))

Or does he mean?:

(defun + (&rest rest) (reduce #'/ rest))
(defun + (&rest rest) (reduce #'* rest))
(defun + (&rest rest) (reduce #'+ rest))
(defun + (&rest rest) (reduce #'- rest))

In fact, there is no way to express it because the scientist, being human, has no conception of what something to be multiple things at the same time without distinction would mean.

In the same vein, an omnipotent demiurge is bound by its own nature. Anthropomorphizing it, it is bound by its goals, logic, thoughts, and imagination. If creating a simulation of a certain nature necessarily implies that that simulation posses a certain attribute which necessarily leads to a certain consequence, then the demiurge simply cannot both create that simulation and avoid that consequence. A hacker simply cannot create a process that both unceasingly conses and unceasingly accesses. It is not just physically impossible, but non-nonsensical.

And so, we come to the concept of 'god.' He is a hacker, living in a world where there is nothing but himself, and has chosen to create a simulation, (necessarily) of himself. This simulation, in order to be true to life, must include things like 'wills' and 'intellects,' and so, even though the great hacker in the sky is omnipotent, he must sacrifice a certain amount of control lest he contradict his own intent. To create a willful creature whose actions are predetermined is a contradiction. This concept, just like the '+' function mentioned earlier, has no meaning and our omnipotent hacker, like the any regular one, cannot do something which has no meaning.

Ownership

I posted an 'essay' a month or two ago where I expressed some copyleft ideas and proposed a thesis against the notion of copyright. I made sure to mention that, although I liked the idea, I saw some obvious difficulties that would need some more explaination. I'm going to try to modify and further develope my ideas by exploring the notion of ownership in general.

Before I continue, here is the previous article: Music.

I am, in general, a follower of Lockean ideas. As such, I am a firm beleiver in the labor theory of ownership (not the labor theory of value.)I will explain: At the start, no human is entiteled to anything except himself. No rock, tree, or animal is his. The material world is not owned by human beings but be God. (Or, by nobody if you're an Atheist; functionally they are the same.) Labor, in my opinion, is a part of own's self. By infusing something with my labor, I infuse it with a part of me. The labor came from me so it is mine and an extension of myself. So I come to own by working.

So, take a rock. This rock is unowned. Now suppose I owere to break that rock until it had a sharp edge. I have now put labor into that rock; I have infused it with a piece of myself. The labor in the rock now belongs to me and, insomuch as the rock is inseperable from that labor, it belongs to me as well. My labor is owned by me because it comes from me; it is an extension of myself. What does not come from me is not owned by me. The rock, per se, is not owned by me, the labor in is owned by me and for some to do something with the rock imply a vandalism or trespassing on my labor, essencially an attack on myself. This, I believe, is the nature of ownership.

Let's apply this to intellectual property. Let us suppose someone creates a song. For now it is in that persons head. This song is the property of that person. It is the property of that person because of the labor that went into it. More particularly, the labor that the person has put into the song is his. Now suppose this person sings this song and I hear it. Now suppose I repeat the song. Have I trespassed against this persons property? No, because I have not touched his labor. The song still exists in his head exactly so I have neither vandalized nor trespassed against that labor. His singing of the song is also the same, I didn't affect his singing. So my storing the song in my head and singing it outloud does not constitute stealing.

Here's the reason. Our friend's labor went into a two instances of that song, the one in his head, and the one he sang. Those two instances are his; I'm not permitted to affect them. But, I couldn't if I wanted to anyway. His labor didn't go into the instance in my head or the instance I sang. MY labor went into those. I listened and formed the song in my head and I sang, so those instances are MINE. Our friend has no claim to them. Now, the common presupisition, is that our friend owns the form of the song or the idea of the song, hence the phrase, "intellectual property," but this is ridiculous. Our friend's labor did not go into this form because the form pre-existed his labor. Any student of Plato knows that the forms are eternal and trancend there material counterparts. Our friend did not create the form for that song. He created the song using it's form. So did I. The potential already existed. Our friend merely discovered the potential for the song and actualized it. I did the same thing in another instance.

Now one may bring up the objection of dependence. Our friend 'discovered' the song, all by himself, but I only listened to him and sang what I heard, thus I profited from his labor. By this logic, I would 'owe' our friend something because I benefited from him; because I recieved something from him, the help from his singing, He deserves something from me, say money. This is wrong however. He cannot demand payment for something he did without my consent. Neither can a man on the street and wash my window without my permission and expect a payment, nor can this man sing and expect me to pay him, even if I go so far as to repeat his song. Just because one person benefits from anothers labor doesn't mean that the first owes the latter anything. I could clean up my front lawn it might make the neighborhood nicer than if I did not, but I would not then be able to demand from the neighbors payment for the rise in property value.

So, our friend is in no position to complain if I copy him and sing 'his' song, or if you copy me and sing the 'same' song, or, if one person at a time, the song is spread all over the world. He is not, by right, owed royalties.

One cannot own a form. On cannot own a form because it is intangable. As I said before, one only owns that which comes from his own person but one cannot inject his labor into an intagible form. One can merely affect the things that possess said form and change them. For this reason, the notion, of 'intellectual property' is an oxymoron.